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Knowledge representation in A.I. involves more than the representation
of a large number of facts or beliefs regarding a given domain, i.e. more than
a mere listing of those facts or beliefs as data structures. It may involve, for
example, an account of the way the properties and relations that are known or
believed to hold of the objects in that domain are organized into a theoretical
whole such as the way di¤erent branches of mathematics, or of physics and
chemistry, or of biology and psychology, etc., are organized, and even the
way di¤erent parts of our commonsense knowledge or beliefs about the world
can be organized.1 But di¤erent theoretical accounts will apply to di¤erent
domains, and one of the questions that arises here is whether or not there
are categorial principles of representation and organization that apply across
all domains regardless of the specic nature of the objects in those domains.
If there are such principles, then they can serve as a basis for a general
framework of knowledge representation independently of its application to
particular domains. In what follows I will give a brief outline of some of the
categorial structures of conceptual realism as a formal ontology. It is this
system that I propose we adopt as the basis of a categorial framework for
knowledge representation.
1See, e.g., Hobbs and Moore 1985.
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1 Predicate Logic
Predicate logic, by which I mean higher-order and not just rst-order pred-
icate logic, provides the clearest and best example of a categorial structure
for organizing the way objects are represented in terms of the properties and
relations that hold between them. Predication is after all the fundamen-
tal nexus of both language and thought and, at least from the ontological
perspective of conceptual realism, of reality as well.
In rst-order predicate logic there is a categorial distinction between pred-
icate expressions (which represent verb phrases of natural language), all of
which have a certain (nite) number of subject or argument positions as
part of their functional role as predicates, and singular terms, e.g. individual
variables and other expressions that can occupy the subject or argument po-
sitions of predicate expressions. But the quantiers of rst-order logic reach
only into the subject or argument positions that are part of the functional
role of predicate expressions, and not into the positions of predicates as well.
The variables to which these quantiers are a¢ xed are called individual vari-
ables, which, because they have all and only the objects in the domain of
discourse as their values, are understood in formal ontology to represent the
basic ontological category of objects. For that reason, the quantier phrases
generated with these variables are called objectual quantiers.
In second-order predicate logic there are also predicate variables that have
predicate expressions (complex or simple) as their substituends, and quan-
tiers are allowed to bind those variables and reach into predicate positions
as well. In nominalism, as a theory of predication (or formal ontology), only
rst-order, objectual quantiers have ontological signicance, which means
that predicate quantiers (and variables) are either omitted altogether or
given only a substitutional interpretation. The latter option brings with it
constraints on the logic of predicate quantiers that in e¤ect exclude impred-
icative formulas, i.e. formulas containing bound predicate variables, from
being substituends of predicate variables (i.e. substituends that preserve va-
lidity according to nominalism). The system that results by imposing these
constraints is known as (standard) predicative second-order logic. (Nominal-
ism can be extended into standard ramied predicative second-order logic in
which formulas with bound predicate variables of a given level of ramication
can be substituends of predicates of any higher level; but it still excludes a
comprehension principle in which formulas with bound predicate variables
of a given level can be substituends of the predicate variables of that or any
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lower level.2 )
Nominalism is too restrictive a framework for knowledge representation in
that it fails to take into account both the conceptual nature of representation
and the ontological structure of the world in terms of which our knowledge
and beliefs about a given domain are organized. Conceptualism goes beyond
nominalism in its recognition of predicable concepts as values of predicate
variables (with respect to which predicate quantiers have referential sig-
nicance), and conceptual realism goes even further in its recognition of the
contents of our concepts as intensional objects (denoted by nominalized pred-
icates) and of the possibility of there being properties, relations, and natural
kinds in nature corresponding to some, even if not all, of our concepts.
Concepts in the sense intended here are intersubjectively realizable (and
in that sense objective) cognitive structures that underlie our ability to think
and communicate with one another. They are not objects (and therefore can-
not be values of individual variables) but are rather unsaturated cognitive
structures that are realized (saturated) in particular mental acts  includ-
ing speech acts as overt forms of mental acts having a communicative role.
Predicable concepts in particular are based on cognitive capacities to identify,
characterize and relate objects in various ways, and they underlie our ability
to follow the rules of language regarding the use of predicate expressions. It
is through the exercise of these capacities that our mental acts (and therefore
our speech acts as well) are informed with a predicable nature.
There are two major types of conceptualism, depending on the constraints
for concept-formation. The rst is a constructive conceptualism, which is so-
called because it imposes a constraint that precludes impredicative concept-
formation, i.e. the formation of concepts on the basis of a totality to which
those concepts belong or form a part. The logic resulting from these con-
straints is a nonstandard form of predicative second-order logic (which can
be extended into a nonstandard form of ramied second-order logic), which
is similar and yet di¤erent from the standard predicative second-order logic
of nominalism. The second is a holistic conceptualism in which impred-
icative concept-formation is allowed, but without nullifying the (ramied)
predicate quantiers that range over the so-called predicative concepts of
constructive conceptualism. It is only this type of conceptualism that pro-
2See Church 1956, section 58, for a formal description of standard predicative second-
order logic, and Cocchiarella 1986a, chapter one, for a semantical formulation of nominal-
ism in terms of such a logic.
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vides an adequate framework for knowledge representation of those parts of
mathematics that essentially involves impredicative concepts such as the
concepts involved in the continuity schema or least upper bound principle of
real number theory. It is only holistic conceptualism that we have in mind
when speaking of conceptualism hereafter.
The universal and existential quantiers, 8 and 9, when a¢ xed to predi-
cate variables, will be understood, accordingly, to refer to predicable concepts
in general, whether predicative or impredicative. In those domains of knowl-
edge representation (such as various branches of mathematics) where the
predicative-impredicative distinction is important, we can use the quantiers
8! and 9! to refer, when a¢ xed to predicate variables, exclusively to the pred-
icative/constructive concepts of the domain in question (as determined by
the logic of constructive conceptualism). In domains where this distinction
is not important, we can simply ignore or omit all formulas containing 8! or
9! as constituents.3
In domains in which the distinction is important, incidentally, we can also
add an epistemic operator k (and suitable axioms) to represent our con-
structive knowledge regarding the objects in those domains. This operator
read as it is constructively knowable that can be used to express various
epistemological principles (much in the manner in which Gödel used the 
of S4 modal logic to interpret sentential intuitionist logic), such as the thesis
that objects will fall under a constructive concept only if it is constructively
knowable that they do. That is, formally,
(K!) (8!F n)(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)! kF (x1; :::; xn)];
can be taken as a valid epistemological principle of conceptualism that distin-
guishes the role of constructive/predicative concepts from predicable concepts
in general. The same thesis with (8!F n) replaced by (8F n) is not valid be-
cause the latter quantier refers to nonconstructive/impredicative concepts
as well. (In general, we use capital Roman letters F , G, H and R, with
or without numerical subscripts, as predicate letters, and x, y, z, with or
without subscripts, as individual variables.) Accordingly, because the com-
plement of a predicative concept is also a predicative concept, the following
Principle of Rigidity for predicative concepts,
(PR!) (8!F n)(8x1):::(8xn)[kF (x1; :::; xn) _k:F (x1; :::; xn)];
3See Cocchiarella 1986b for the formal details of the logic of constructive and holistic
conceptualism.
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is valid in the general domain of constructive knowledge (as understood in
constructive conceptualism).
The question as to which primitive predicate constants stand for construc-
tive/predicative concepts in a given domain can be decided only by external
criteria. For example, if P is a predicate constant that is to stand for a
predicative concept of a given domain as decided by some external criteria,
we can express this fact internally by means of a meaning postulate of the
following form:
(9!F n)k(8x1):::(8xn)[F (x1; :::; xn)$ P (x1; :::; xn)]:
Which complex formulas represent predicative concepts of the domain
is then determined by the comprehension principle and other laws of the
predicative logic of constructive conceptualism.
2 Conceptual Intensional Realism and the Logic
of Nominalized Predicates
Higher-order predicate logic goes beyond the impredicative second-order logic
of holistic conceptualism by introducing a syntactical operation that trans-
forms predicates (and formulas) into abstract singular terms, i.e. into nom-
inalized predicates (and formulas). The operation is indicated here by the
deletion of the parentheses (and commas in the case of a relational predicate)
that are part of a predicate expression in its functional role as a predicate.
For example, in addition to the role of F in F (x) as a predicate expression,
we also have the role of the nominalization of F as an abstract singular term
in G(F ) and R(y; F ) as well as in F (F ), where F occurs rst with a pair
of parentheses as a predicate expression, and then without the parentheses
as a singular term. For complex predicates, as determined by formulas, we
will use the -operator (which binds the variables a¢ xed to it.) Thus, where
 is a formula, and x1; :::; xn are distinct individual variables, [x1:::xn] is
an n-place predicate expression, which in its role as a predicate brings with
it a pair of parentheses (and commas if n > 1) as, e.g. in its occurrence
in [x1:::xn](y1; :::; yn). The nominalization of such a complex predicate ex-
pression is represented the same way as for simple predicate letters; namely,
by deleting the parentheses (and commas) that are a functional part of its
role as a predicate as, e.g., in R(y; [x]), as well as in [x]([x]), where
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the one-place predicate expression [x] occurs both as a predicate and as
an abstract singular terms. (By means of -abstraction, a formula  can be
construed as a 0-place predicate, [], which, as an abstract singular term,
is read as that . For convenience, we write []instead of []. It is in
this way that we will represent nominalized formulas hereafter.)
What a nominalized predicate denotes, if it denotes anything at all, can-
not be the concept that the predicate stands for in its role as a predicate
because concepts, as we have said, are unsaturated cognitive structures, and
as such they are not objects. In conceptual realism what a nominalized pred-
icate denotes is an intensional object namely, the intension or content of
the concept that the predicate stands for in its role as a predicate. Here, by
the intension or content of a concept I mean a hypostatization, reication,
or projection into the domain of objects of the truth conditions determined
by the di¤erent possible applications of that concept. It is by means of such
a projection, or conceptual nominalization, that we purport to denote the
intension or content of a concept as if it were an independently existing real
Platonic form. Thus, for example, not only do we predicate of someone
that she is kind and wise, or of a box that it is green and rectangular, but
also, through conceptual nominalization of the concepts that we predicate,
we purport to denote the properties (in the Platonic sense) of being kind
and being wise, or the properties of being green and being rectangular i.e.
the properties kindness, wisdom, greenness, and rectangularity. It is through
conceptual nominalization (as a product of cultural evolution) that we hy-
postatize or reify a concept and are able to grasp its content or intension as
an (abstract) object by starting out from the concept as a cognitive capacity.
The assumption that conceptual nominalization (reication) leads to real ab-
stract objects (as emergent products of cultural evolution) is an ontological
posit that goes beyond conceptualism proper, and it forms part of what I
mean by conceptual realism as a formal ontology. This part of conceptual
realism is called conceptual intensional realism.4
The addition into impredicative second-order logic of nominalized pred-
icates as abstract singular terms was the move that Frege made in going
from the system of his Begri¤sschrift to that of his Grundgesetze. (He did
this, in e¤ect, through his use of the spiritus lenis (or smooth breathing
;
),
4In Brachman 1985 it is claimed that the knowledge representation programming lan-
guage KL-ONE needs a metadescription" level in which to deal with KL-ONE concepts as
internal entities" (198). Such a level" is contained in the logic of nominalized predicates
that is part of the system of conceptual intensional realism.
6
as an abstraction operator. Thus, instead of F (F ), or F ([xF (x)]), as in
our notation, Frege used F (
;
F (
;
)).) This addition was important and fun-
damental to Freges development of arithmetic as part of logic, by which he
meant only extensional logic. That is why the objects he took nominalized
predicates to denote in his system were classes (Begri¤sumfange) or value-
ranges (Wertverläufe), rather than the intensional objects that we take them
to be in conceptual realism. Our intensional approach does not a¤ect Freges
reduction of arithmetic to logic, and in fact it opens a new and important
way of developing knowledge representation in intensional mathematics.5 In-
deed, in conceptual realism (as I understand it here) all abstract objects are
assumed to be concept-correlates (i.e. hypostatized, or reied, contents of
concepts) that have their being in the concepts whose correlates they are.
(But this does not mean that all existential posits regarding such objects can
be be justied on purely conceptual or logical grounds.)
A logic of nominalized predicates is important not only for an analy-
sis of mathematical objects but also for an adequate representation of the
nominalized predicate expressions of natural language and of the things we
say in terms of such expressions. It is by means of such a logic, as I have
explained elsewhere, that a formal account can be given of the intensional
verbs of natural language, including in particular the verbs that represent
propositional attitudes.6 It is also in this way that a logical analysis of c-
tion, and of the content of stories in general, whether true or false, can be
given. A comprehensive system of knowledge representation should include
not only the conceptual structures of (impredicative) second-order predicate
logic, accordingly, but also the logic and ontology of nominalized predicates
(and sentences) as well.
The one problem with this proposal is Russells paradox (which is a special
case of Cantors paradox). That is, with nominalized predicates and an
impredicative comprehension principle, Russells paradox is derivable from
the following instance of the comprehension principle:
(9F )(8x)[F (x)$ (9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))]:
Russells solution to his paradox was the theory of ramied types, which,
for most purposes, could be simplied to the theory of simple types. It is
the latter system that is now generally referred to as higher-order predicate
5See Shapiro 1985 for a survey of some approaches to intensional mathematics.
6See Cocchiarella 1989b, sections 7-9.
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logic. It was Churchs version of the theory of simple types, for example,
that Montague developed into an intensional logic that became the seman-
tical framework for natural language in what is now known as Montague
grammar.7
There are a number of problems with the theory of types as a frame-
work for knowledge representation, not the least of which is its inability
to provide an adequate account of certain meaningful sentences of natural
language that violate the restrictions of type theory. Fortunately, these prob-
lems can be overcome by shifting type restrictions from the object-language
to the metalanguage in particular to the conditions of well-formedness for
-abstracts as complex predicates. The result of imposing these restrictions
on the -abstracts of second-order predicate logic with nominalized predi-
cates as abstract singular terms is known as the system HST , which I
have shown to be equiconsistent with the theory of simple types.8 G. Chier-
chia has subsequently shown that HST  (supplemented with tense and
modal operators) can be used in Montague grammar in place of Montagues
type-theoretical intensional logic.9
The restriction on -abstracts does not mean that formulas of the form
F (F ), or, as in Russells argument, :F (F ), are meaningless in HST . In
fact, (9F )F (F ) is provable in HST  (for F = [x(x = x)]). Nevertheless, it
is inappropriate in conceptualism that the complex predicate for the Russell
concept namely, [x (9G)(x = G^:G(x))] should not be well-formed. It
is, after all, through the construction of this concept that we are able even to
think of Russells argument. Fortunately, the restriction does not apply to
another system I have formulated, namely, HST  , that is closely related to
HST . In HST  , the -abstract for the Russell concept is well-formed, as
are all -abstracts of second-order logic with nominalized predicates. Rus-
sells paradox is avoided in this system not by rejecting the Russell concept
but by denying that the nominalization of such a concept must denote. That
is, although the Russell concept existsqua concept, i.e.
(9F ) ([x(9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = F )
is provable in HST  , nevertheless, because of the truth conditions it deter-
mines, this concept cannot be nominalized (i.e. hypostatized/reied) so as
7See Montague 1974, chapters 7 and 8.
8See Cocchiarella 1986a.
9See Chierchia 1984 and Chierchia 1985.
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to result in an object, i.e.,
:(9y) ([x (9G)(x = G ^ :G(x))] = y)
is also provable in HST  . (This mean that, unlike HST
, the logic of
HST  is free of existential presuppositions regarding singular terms. Con-
ceptual nominalization only purports to denote the result of a projection or
hypostatization of the truth conditions of a concept and such a projection
or hypostatization cannot succeed if those truth conditions lead to a contra-
diction.) The two systems HST  and HST  , as I have shown elsewhere
(in 1986a), are equiconsistent, which means that HST  is also equiconsistent
with the theory of simple types, and that therefore it is as good as HST 
as the basis of an intensional logic for Montague grammar. It is HST  ,
supplemented (when needed) with the predicative logic of constructive con-
ceptualism, that we propose to take as the basic predicate logic for knowledge
representation.
3 Tense and Modal Logic
A fundamental feature of all conceptual (and A.I.) activity as a temporal
process are the internal cognitive schemata by which we orientate ourselves
in time. Such schemata are implicit in the form and content of all our mental
acts. In mathematical or strictly scientic theories or domains of knowledge
representation, these schemata are usually replaced by a tenseless (at time
t) idiom based upon some externally imposed metric. Such an idiom is not
appropriate for the representation of any form of conceptual activity in which
it is necessary to distinguish between the past, the present, and the future as
internal features of our mental acts, including, in particular, natural language
understanding. Indeed, in natural language with its dating and temporal
language of years, months, days, minutes, etc., the distinction between the
past, the present and the future remains an essential component of the tenses
of our verbs. We say, for example, that Columbus discovered America in 1492,
and that the republicans will try to regain the U.S. presidency in 1996, etc.,
so that even the inclusion of a date (and time) does not a¤ect our intrinsic
temporal orientation in terms of the past, the present and the future.
One way to represent the internal cognitive schemata by which we orient
ourselves in time is by means of the tense operators P and F , which are read
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it was the case thatand it will be the case that, respectively. There are
other tense operators we might introduce as well, such as N , for it is now
the case that, or S and U for sinceand until; but we will restrict ourselves
here to just P and F .10 The simple present tense, which (given quantication
over past and future objects) covers most of the purposes of N , is implicit in
all basic form of predication. The operators P and F are then understood to
modify the simple present tense into the past and future tense, respectively;
and iterated applications of these operators are then understood to represent
the past of the past, the future of the past, the past of the future, the future
of the future, etc.
Di¤erent assumptions about the structure of time, e.g. that it is dense,
discrete, continuous, that it has a beginning, an end, or neither, etc., can
be represented in terms of these operators. We will assume as invariant for
knowledge representation only the tense-logical truths of a serially ordered
local time and leave additional assumptions about the structure of time to
special domains of knowledge representation.11 For purposes of special rel-
ativity theory, other local times can be brought into our analyses through
the introduction of causal tense operators Pc and Fc, which can be read as
it causally was the case thatand it causally will be the case that, and
which are based upon a (light) signal relation between the momentary states
of the continuants underlying di¤erent local times. Unlike the logical struc-
ture of the standard tenses, which represent a serial ordering, the logical
structure of these tenses represent only a (strict) partial ordering. It is in
terms of these causal tense operators, and not the standard tense operators
(representing the linearity of a local time), that we can represent the pos-
sibility of special relativity theory in which a state of a¤airs can come (in
the causal future of the posterior cone) to have been the case (in the causal
past of the then prior cone) without its ever actually being the case. That
is, (FcPc ^ :[Pc _  _Fc]) is consistent in special relativity theory, even
though (FP  ^ :[P  _  _ F ]) is not.12
Tense logic also provides the means by which we can represent various
alethic modal notions. (Cognitive modalities, such as belief or desire, are
analyzed in terms of intensional objects, and not states of a¤airs the way
10See Prior 1967 for a general account of tense logic.
11See Cocchiarella 1991 for a complete axiom set for tense-logical truth as understood
here.
12See Cocchiarella 1984, section 15, for a set-theoretic semantics of the di¤erence be-
tween the standard and the causal tense operators.
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alethic modalities are.) Indeed, some of the rst alethic modal notions ever
described in the history of thought are based on the cognitive schemata
characterizing our orientation in time. The Megarian logician, Diodorus, for
example, argued that what is possible is what either is or will be the case,
and that what is necessary is what is and always will be the case13 :
f =df  _ F ;
f =df  ^ :F::
For Aristotle, the possible included the past as well as the present and
the future; i.e. what is possible, according to Aristotle, is what either was,
is, or will be the case (and therefore what is necessary is what always was,
is, and always will be the case):
t =df P  _  _ F ;
t =df :P : ^  ^ :F: ;
Similar modal notions can be dened in terms of the causal tense opera-
tors, and a variety of other modal notions as well (such as a temporal notion
of necessity based on the way the past has been).
In addition to the alethic modalities that can be analyzed in terms of tense
operators, we also need a modality that goes beyond the actual events and
states of a¤airs that make up the space-time manifold of our universe but
which does not also go beyond the causal structure of the world as deter-
mined by the laws of nature. That is, we need a causal or natural necessity
to represent what is invariant across all possible worlds that have the same
laws of nature as ours, and which in that regard is part of the natural realism
that is implicit in our scientic theories, and explicit in our commonsense
understanding of the world. The logic of natural realism is another compo-
nent of what I mean by conceptual realism as a formal ontology, and for the
purposes of developing this component, I will use c, and its dual c, as
modal operators for causal or natural necessity and its dual possibility.
13See Prior, op. cit. for a discussion of Diodoruss argument.
11
4 The Logic of Existence as Part of the Logic
of Being
In addition to the di¤erent temporal modalities that are implicit in the intrin-
sic temporal form of our conceptual activity, there are also di¤erent modes
or kinds of being in the general category of objects. There are, for example,
past objects, i.e. objects that did exist but no longer exist, and future objects
that have yet to exist. That is, there are objects that do not (at present)
exist, but which either did exist or will exist, and in that regard such objects
have being even if they do not (now) also have existence.
There are nonexistent objects of other modes of being as well that we
should be able to distinguish in special domains of knowledge representation.
There are, for example, objects that are merely possible in nature (such as the
oak tree that an acorn could have grown into before that acorn was crushed
underfoot) i.e. objects that could have existed in nature, but in fact never
will exist at all (in our space-time universe). And then there are also abstract
objects, i.e. objects that because of their abstract nature cannot exist (in the
space-time manifold of any causally possible world), but which nevertheless
have being as objects (i.e. as values of bound individual variables) which is
why we say there are such objects. Indeed, we can even say in indirect forms
of speech that such objects exist as when we say that someone believes
that Pegasus exists, or when we say of ctional characters that they exist
in the abstract world of a certain story. But this sort of abstract existence
is not the same as the existence in a concrete possible world because it
is only as constituents of propositions (such as the propositions that make
up the content of someones beliefs, or the content of a story, etc.) that
abstract objects can be said to exist (in an indirect form of speech). Here,
by a proposition we mean the type of intensional object that is denoted
by a nominalized sentence (as opposed to the state of a¤airs that might
correspond to the sentence itself). Propositions in this sense make up the
abstract worlds of our theories, stories, beliefs, etc., which, unlike the concrete
worlds made up of events and states of a¤airs, are usually incomplete, and in
some cases even inconsistent. Existence only in an abstract world made up of
propositions is not real existence, which is why we say that although abstract
objects have being as objects they nevertheless do not, indeed cannot, exist.
A general framework for knowledge representation should be able to make
all of these distinctions. In conceptual realism, we use the one-place predi-
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cate constant E! to stand for the concept of (concrete) existence so that x
exists(in the sense of concrete actuality) can be symbolized as E!(x). The
predicates for past and future existence can be represented, accordingly, by
[x PE!(x)] and [x FE!(x)], and existence at some time or other in the his-
tory of the universe can be represented by [x tE!(x)]. Abstract existence
(within the category of objects) can be dened negatively as the being of
an object that cannot exist (as a concrete actuality), i.e. as [x :cE!(x)].
Restricted quantiers for existents can be dened in terms of objectual quan-
tiers and E! as follows:
(8ex) =df (8x)[E!(x)! ];
(9ex) =df (9x)[E!(x) ^ ]:
The distinction between being and existence (within the category of ob-
jects) is present in natural language not only in the distinction between the
quantier phrases there are (is, be) and there exist(s), but also in the
distinction between those verb phrases (predicates) that entail existence (i.e.
that can be true only of objects that exist) and those that do not. An
object cannot be green, or red, or blue, etc., for example, unless it has a
spatio-temporal location and exists as a concrete object. Similarly an object
cannot be a horse (winged or not), or a mountain (made entirely of gold or
not), unless it exists as a concrete object. But an object can be believed to
be a (winged) horse, or it can be believed to be a (gold) mountain, and still
not exist (in the space-time manifold), in which case its mode of being is
that of an intensional object of someones belief space. That is, unlike being
a (winged) horse, or being a (gold) mountain, being believed to be a (winged)
horse, or being believed to be a (gold) mountain, does not entail existence.
Similarly, being a number also does not entail (concrete) existence, but that
does not mean that there are no numbers, i.e. that numbers do not have
being as objects. And then too, being an ancestor of Bill Clinton, or being
a future female president of the U.S.A., also do not entail existence, in that
many of Clintons ancestors no longer exist, and none of the future female
presidents of the USA may yet have been born, which indicates that it is
not only the verb phrases (predicates) for abstract objects that do not entail
existence, but also phrases for past and future objects as well.
The distinction between verb phrases (predicates) that do, and verb
phrases that do not, entail existence is determined by the predicable con-
cepts that such phrases stand for  because it is the concepts that such
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phrases stand for that determines their truth conditions. In one form or
another, this distinction has been noted by medieval and nineteenth cen-
tury logicians, such as, e.g., Bolzano.14 It is implicit in Meinongs theory of
objects, where it corresponds to his distinction between nuclear (konstitu-
torisch) and extra-nuclear (ausserkonstitutorisch) properties.15 Formally, in
conceptual realism, where concepts that entail existence are called e-concepts,
we use the restricted quantiers 8e and 9e to refer to e-concepts when a¢ xed
to predicate variables. That is, unlike the predicate quantiers (8F n) and
(9F n), which range over all (n-ary) concepts, (8eF n) and (9eF n) range only
over (n-ary) e-concepts.
Existence itself, it should be noted, is itself an e-concept, but one that is
quite di¤erent from most ordinary e-concepts (such as being green, or being a
horse, etc.), which involve being in the world in a specic concrete way. This
is because, unlike most ordinary e-concepts, existence is an impredicative
e-concept in that to exist is the same as to fall under an e-concept (of the
ordinary sort). Instead of being taken primitively, accordingly, existence can
be dened impredicatively (in terms of a totality to which it belongs) as
follows:
E!(x) =df (9eF )F (x):
The logic of existence, as developed in terms of the quantiers 8e and 9e
a¢ xed to both predicate and individual variables, can be developed either
as a form of actualism or as part of possibilism, which can in turn be part
of a more general framework such we have in mind here.16 In those domains
of knowledge representation where the distinction between e-concepts and
concepts in general is not important, the second-order part of this logic can
be ignored or omitted. But in some domains, such as the semantics and
ontology of ction in Parsonss reconstruction of Meinongs theory of objects,
the distinction is important in the way it shows how Meinongian objects,
and ctional objects in particular, can be interpreted in terms of properties
of e-properties as intensional objects, i.e. in terms of the intensions of e-
concepts.17
14See Bolzano 1972 (rst published in German in 1837), p.xxxi.
15See Cocchiarella 1987, chapter 3, for a reduction of Meinongs nuclear-extranuclear
distinction (as reconstructed in Parsons 1980) in terms of the di¤erence (in logical realism)
between e-properties and properties in general.
16See Cocchiarella 1991 and 1989a, sections 10-13, for a description of this logic in terms
of actualism and possibilism.
17See Parsons 1980 and Cocchiarella 1987, chapter 3. Also, see Landini 1990 for dis-
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5 Conceptual Natural Realism
As intensional objects, properties and relations are really not universals in
the sense of predicable entities, i.e. they are not what predicates stand for
when functioning as predicates. Rather, as we have said, they are the ab-
stract objects denoted by nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms.
Predicates, in their functional role as predicates, are not singular terms, and
the universals that they stand for in conceptualism are not objects indeed,
they cannot be objects, intensional or otherwise, precisely because of their
predicable nature as functional, unsaturated cognitive structures.
There is another notion of property or relation in which properties and
relations have a predicable nature, however but in which, like concepts, they
also are not objects. This is the notion in which properties and relations are
the unsaturated nexuses or physical structures that underlie the possible
states of a¤airs that can obtain in the world, i.e. the nexuses that are part
of the causal structure of the space-time manifold. It is the saturation of
properties and relations in this sense that gives material content to the states
of a¤airs that in fact obtain in the world, and it is this material content that
is the basis upon which the laws of nature are founded. For it is this notion of
a property or relation that is involved in our scientic and theoretical posits
about the world i.e. posits in which such natural properties and relations
are assumed to exist (as universals) corresponding to certain of our concepts.
We call the framework in which such posits can be made conceptual nat-
ural realism, which is the second realist component to what we mean here by
conceptual realism as a formal ontology. Thus, with respect to this compo-
nent, there is, in addition to the primary sense in which a predicate stands
for a concept, a secondary sense in which a predicate also stands for the nat-
ural property or relation that corresponds to that concept if, in fact, there
is such a corresponding natural property or relation.
We add this last qualication here because not all concepts are assumed
to have a natural property or relation corresponding to them. Unlike theo-
retical concepts, for example, such an assumption does not apply to most of
the observational concepts that we employ in our scientic theories. Here,
cussion of an alternative reconstruction of Meinong and of how that reconstruction can
also be reduced to the system HST  . In Hirst 1989, the importance of having a system
of knowledge representation in which the di¤erent notions of existence and being that we
express in natural language can be expressed is noted and discussed but Hirst himself
seems to have only the Meinongian tradition in mind as a way of achieving this.
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the distinction between theoretical concepts and observational concepts is
analogous to the historical contrast between primary and secondary quali-
ties. That is, primary qualities, on this analogy, are the concepts that are
assumed to have a natural property or relation corresponding to them, and
secondary qualities are those that are not. Unlike the historical dichotomy,
however, the theoretical-observational distinction between concepts is not
absolute and can be applied with more or less rigor, depending on the kind
of domain of knowledge representation is in question. In highly theoretical
scientic domains, for example, the empirical grounds on which the distinc-
tion is made will be generally very rigorous, whereas in the more informal
domains of commonsense knowledge, the distinction will have a certain de-
gree of arbitrariness to it, depending on the standards and customs of the
domain in question. In either case, what is important is the more general
distinction between the order of conception (with its formal categories of
thought) and the order of being, both abstract and concrete, as structured
by the ontological categories of reality.
This di¤erence between the order of conception and the order of being
does not bring with it a di¤erence in logical form between those predicates
that stand for concepts and those that stand for natural properties and rela-
tions at least, it does not in conceptual realism as a formal ontology. The
same predicate can stand in a double way both for a concept (in the primary
sense of what determines the truth conditions and correct use of that pred-
icate) and a natural property or relation (in the secondary sense of what,
if anything, in nature corresponds to those truth conditions). Similarly, an
n-place predicate variable can be taken in a double way to have both n-ary
concepts and n-ary natural properties or relations as its values, the di¤erence
being determined in context only by whether or not the variable is bound by
a quantier for concepts or a quantier for natural properties and relations.
The latter quantiers are symbolized here by 8nand 9n, which, when af-
xed to predicate variables, are understood to refer to all, or some, natural
properties or relations, respectively. (It is in just this way, but in terms
of the quantiers 8! and 9!, or the quantiers 8e and 9e; that we earlier
distinguished quantier phrases that refer only to constructive/predicative
concepts, or only to e-concepts, respectively, as opposed to those in terms of
8 and 9 that range over concepts in general, predicative or impredicative, or
existence-entailing or not.)
The fundamental thesis of natural realism is that every (j -ary) natural
property or relation must, as a matter of natural necessity, be realizable in
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nature. This thesis can be stated as follows (with the rule of necessitation
for c applying to it and other theses of natural realism):
(NR) (8nF j)c(9ex1):::(9exj)F (x1; :::; xj):
This thesis amounts to a modication of Aristotles moderate realism,
according to which properties and relations can exist only in re, i.e. only in
the (concrete) objects that have those properties and relations. What (NR)
represents instead is a modal moderate realism in which natural properties
and relations have a mode of being within the causal structure of the world
independently of whether or not there are objects having those properties and
relations - but not independently of whether or not there could be objects
having those properties and relations (in the sense of a causal possibility
in nature) (E.g., some properties of transuranic elements will never have
instances, because in fact there will never be any atoms of those elements
in our world  but, given su¢ cient technology and energy resources, the
possibility of such atoms being caused to exist in accelerators is not precluded
by the laws of nature.)
The thesis (NR) does not apply to concepts, but only to natural prop-
erties and relations  a di¤erence that is indicative of the distinction be-
tween the conceptual and the ontological orders. (Contradictory concepts,
for example, cannot be realized by any existing object.) Another di¤erence
between the two orders is that natural properties and relations, but not con-
cepts, are identical, if and only if, as a matter of natural necessity, they
always have the same instances. This form of cross-world identitycan be
formally dened as follows:
(F c G) =df c(8x1):::(8xj)[F (x1; :::; xj)$ G(x1; :::; xj)]:
The assumption that there is a natural property or relation corresponding
to a given (j -ary) concept [x1:::xj ], i.e. that a concept in the one order
represents a natural property or relation in the other, can be formulated in
terms of csimply as
(9nF j) ([x1:::xj ] c F ) :
This kind of assumption, it must be emphasized, is at best only a scientic
hypothesis that can be added as a data structure to particular domains of
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knowledge representation, and, unlike instances of the comprehension prin-
ciple for concepts, it is not to be construed as a logico-conceptual truth.18
6 Referential Concepts
All of the logical forms introduced so far are perspicuous in the way they
specify the truth conditions of formulas in terms of the recursive operations
of logical syntax. In this sense logical forms are semantic structures in their
own right and do not depend on an external set-theoretic semantics for their
interpretation (although such an external semantics may be useful as a guide
in proving certain metatheoretic results19). This is not all there is to the
notion of a logical form in conceptualism, however; for in addition to being
logically perspicuous as a semantic structure, a logical form can also be per-
spicuous conceptually in the way it represents the cognitive structure of a
thought or speech act, including, in particular, the referential and predica-
ble concepts underlying that act.20 Not all logical forms will be perspicuous
in this way, it should be noted, because as semantic structures most will be
concerned only with the inferential (deductive) part of the overall framework.
Referential and predicable concepts are not the same, but rather are com-
plementary, types of cognitive structures where the structural complemen-
tarity in question is analogous to the way that quantier phrases are comple-
mentary to predicate phrases. That is, predicable concepts, as unsaturated
cognitive structures based upon capacities to identify, characterize, and re-
late objects in various ways, are complemented in speech acts by referential
concepts as cognitive structures that enable us to refer (or purport to refer)
to the objects that we characterize and relate to one another. And, just as it
is the exercise of a predicable concept that informs such an act with a pred-
icable nature, so it is the exercise of a referential concept that informs that
act with a referential nature. Similarly, just as it is a predicable concept that
18See Cocchiarella 1986a, chapter 3, and Cocchiarella 1989a for a detailed development
of the logic of natural realism.
19See Cocchiarella 1988 for a defense of the distinction between an external and an
internal semantics that is based on the more fundamental distinction between a formal
theory of predication (such as conceptual realism) and a theory of membership in a set.
20This distinction between semantic and cognitive structure, especially in the way the
latter is based on referential sortal concepts, is analogous to the distinction in KL-ONE
between a formalism for assertion and another for description. See Brachman 1985, p.
174.
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underlies our ability to follow the rules of language in the use of a predicate
expression, so it is a referential concept that underlies our ability to follow
the rules of language in the use of a referential expression. Indeed, strictly
speaking, our knowledge of the rules of language for the correct use of di¤er-
ent types of expressions is not propositional knowledge but knowledge in the
sense of our having these di¤erent types of concepts as cognitive capacities;
and our following those rules in particular speech acts is just a matter of our
exercising those concepts as cognitive capacities. It is this notion of a concept
as a rule-following capacity that is also realizable in A.I., moreover which is
why conceptual realism is an ideal framework for knowledge representation
in A.I.
Now the complementarity of referential and predicable concepts is syn-
tactically realized in natural language in the di¤erence between noun phrases
and verb phrases. Every a¢ rmative assertion (speech act) that is syntacti-
cally analyzable in terms of a noun phrase and verb phrase (regardless of the
complexity of either) is semantically analyzable in terms of an overt appli-
cation of a referential and a predicable concept and the assertion itself is
just the result of their mutual saturation in that joint application. A speech
act in which All ravens are black is asserted, for example, is the result
of jointly applying the referential concept that the noun phrase all ravens
stands for which, formally, we symbolize as (8x Raven) with the pred-
icable concept that the verb phrase is blackstands for which, formally,
is symbolized as Black( ), or as the -abstract [x Black(x)]( ). Thus,
in conceptualism, the logical form of the sentence All ravens are black is
given as (8x Raven)Black(x), which represents the cognitive structure of
an assertion of that sentence as well as its truth conditions. The logical form
of Some ravens are not black, with the negation understood internally as
part of the predicate, is (9x Raven)[x :Black(x)](x):
As referential expressions, the objectual quantier phrases (8x) and (9x)
(or their rewrite variants) that we have used so far are really phrases of the
form (8x Object)and (9x Object), with the category of objects now made
explicit as part of the expression. For convenience, we will continue to use
the more familiar notation but only as an abbreviatory device although,
occasionally, we will also use the complete expression to emphasize a point of
analysis. In general, accordingly, an objectual quantier phrase consists not
just of a quantier a¢ xed to an individual variable, but also of a common
noun, or what we will call a common name (which may be simple or complex).
Grammatically, in English, common names di¤er from predicates in that
19
they admit the denite and indenite articles, plural endings, the adjectives
same, other, another, and quantier words, such as all, every, no,
some, many, most, few, one, two, three, etc. Usually, in a prac-
tice going back to Frege, common names are represented in logical syntax as
predicates perhaps because often there are adjectives associated with them
in natural language (the way the adjectives canine, equine, etc. are associ-
ated with the common names dog, horse, etc.). We will represent the pred-
icate associated with a common name S as the -abstract [x (9y S)(x = y)],
which may be read as is (identical with) an S, or, nominalized, as to be
(identical with) an S. By -conversion, we can abbreviate the application
of such a predicate as follows:
x S =df (9y S)(x = y):
The connection between our new logical forms, e.g. (8x S)F (x) and
(9x S)F (x), and the more usual forms is given in the following formulas,
which we take as laws of logic (having arbitrary formulas as substituends for
F ):
(8x S)F (x)$ (8x)[x S ! F (x)];
(9x S)F (x)$ (9x)[x S ^ F (x)]:
Here it should be noted that despite their logical equivalence, i.e. their
equivalence in determining the same truth conditions, the formulas on each
side of these biconditionals do not represent the same speech acts because
whereas the speech act represented by the formula on the left side is informed
by a referential concept to all (or some) S and predicates of them that they
are F , the speech act represented by the formula on the right side is informed
by a referential concept to all (or some) objects and predicates of each of them
that if it is an S, then it is also F (or of some object that it is both an S
and F ).21
Complex common names in English are generated from more basic com-
mon names by attaching a relative clause to the latter. We represent the
21Strictly speaking, in order to represent the cognitive structure of a speech act, the
referential concept represented by the quantier expression occurring in the predicate
phrase on the right-hand side of each of these biconditionals must be deactivatedand
intensionalized (through nominalization of the corresponding predicable concept). See
Cocchiarella 1989b for a fuller explanation of the di¤erence between an activated and a
deactivated referential concept.
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operation of attaching a relative clause to a common name by =, so that if
S is a common name and  is a formula, then S=is a complex common
name (read as S (who, which) that is (are) ). For example, the sen-
tence Every citizen over twenty-one is eligible to votecontains the complex
common name citizen (who is) over twenty-oneand can be symbolized (in
longhand) as
(8x Citizen=x is over 21)Eligible  to  vote(x):
The logical connection between such complex common names and the
more usual logical forms associated with relative clauses is given in the follow-
ing additional laws of logic (where S is a schema letter for common names):
(8x S=)F (x)$ (8x S)[! F (x)];
(9x S=)F (x)$ (9x S)[ ^ F (x)]:
Iterations of the /-operation can be reduced by means of these laws to simple
conjunctions; that is, by the above laws and other standard transformations,
(8x S== )F (x)$ (8x S= ^  )F (x);
(9x S== )F (x)$ (9x S= ^  )F (x);
are valid theses of conceptualism.
Finally, it should be noted that singular reference by means of proper
names and denite descriptions can be represented as special forms of com-
mon name reference. A proper name, for example, can be dened as a com-
mon name that necessarily picks out at most one object, and necessarily one
and the same object whenever that object exists:
PN(S) =df (8x S)[c(8y S)(y = x) ^c(E!(x)! x S)]:
(We assume here that c implies t). Note that because abstract ob-
jects cannot exist, the second conjunct is redundant in the case of names
for abstract objects (such as numerals). We should also note that singular
reference by means of a proper name can be without, as well as with, ex-
istential presuppositions, a distinction that is accommodated in our present
notation by the di¤erence in semantic roles between (9x S), for the use of a
proper name S with existential presupposition, and (8x S), for the use of S
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without such presupposition. A similar distinction can be made for denite
descriptions as well.22
7 The logic of Sortals
Referential concepts are initially developed not in terms of reference to ob-
jects in general but to objects of a sort where, by a sort (or sortal concept),
I mean a type of concept (such as Raven, dog, horse, car, tomato, etc.) whose
use in thought and communication is associated with certain identity criteria,
i.e. criteria by which we are able to distinguish and count objects of the sort
in question. Sortal concepts are expressed in natural language by common
names, both complex and simple.23
Not all common names stand for a sort. The common names thing,
individual, objectdo not, for example, because the concept of a thing, in-
dividual, or object simpliciter (which is the common name concept to which
all others are subordinate), is not associated in its use with any particu-
lar identity criteria. In fact, the concept of a thing, individual, or object
simpliciter, is constructed, according to conceptualism, on the basis of the
concept of a sort.24 Formally, such a construction can be put in the form
of a contextual denition according to which a reference to every (or some)
object is in e¤ect a reference to every (or some) object of any (or some) sort:
(8x Object) =df (8S)(8x S);
(9x Object) =df (9S)(9x S);
where S is a variable having sortal concepts (of a given domain) as values.
(We will hereafter use S and T , with or without subscripts, as sortal vari-
ables.)
The above analysis does not commit us to the view that we cannot refer
to objects without rst being able to identify those objects as being of some
specic sort. That is, it allows that we can refer to objects as being of some
22See Cocchiarella 1989b, section 6.
23Sortal concepts are the sortal universals, as opposed to the characterizing universals,
of Strawson 1959, and correspond to the substantival, as opposed to the adjectival, general
terms of Geach 1962.
24Compare Sellars 1963, p. 253f.
22
sort or other without having any particular sort in mind, or without even
being able to specify a particular range of sorts. (Its a thing of some sort
I know not what is quite meaningful in English.) If it is in fact possible
to refer to objects that are in principle not identiable as being of any sort
at all, i.e. if there is a form of reference to objects that the above analysis
fails to capture, then it is doubtful that such a form is any way relevant
to a framework for knowledge representation in A.I. The above analysis,
accordingly, can be taken at least as a methodological thesis, if not also as a
conceptual truth of the logic of sortals.
There are many common name concepts other than that of a thing, in-
dividual, or object simpliciter that are not sortal concepts, i.e. that are not
associated with any particular identity criteria. The concept of an artifact,
for example, is not a sortal concept but it is a common-name concept hav-
ing many di¤erent sortal concepts as subordinates. (Consider the problem
of trying to write a program for a robot to identify artifacts simpliciter on
other planets or worlds, i.e. a program that does not specify any particular
sort(s) of artifact the robot is to look for.) Similarly, the concept of an event
is a common-name concept but not a sortal concept, although, as in the case
of artifacts, there are many sorts of events, i.e. there are many subordinate
sortal concepts for events.
In general, non-sortal common name concepts to which sortal concepts
are subordinate, such as the concept of an artifact, are not denable in terms
of a disjunction of their subordinate sortals.25 Instead, in domains in which
such concepts are relevant, they can be represented by primitive common
names, and the list of their subordinates can be given in terms of a list of
meaning postulates. For example, in a domain in which we want to refer to
various sorts of artifacts, we might have some of the following (listing various
25See Cohen and Murphy 1984, p. 40, where the idea of such disjunctive denitions is
also rejected.
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sorts of furniture, various means of travel, etc.) as meaning postulates:
(8x Chair)x Artifact;
(8x Table)x Artifact
...
(8x Car)x Artifact;
(8x Airplane)x Artifact;
...
Similarly, in a domain in which we want to refer to various sorts of events,
we might have
(8x Kiss)x Event;
(8x Declaration  of  war)x Event;
(8x F lash  of  lightning)x Event;
...
as meaning postulates.
The concept of a physical object (i.e. of a continuant) is also not a sortal,
and yet it is important to distinguish physical objects from events, which
also exist (as part of the concrete world), i.e. which also are objects that
can exist. One way to do this is by restricting the meaning of thing(as
opposed to object) so as to exclude events, i.e. by assuming the following
as a meaning postulate:
(8x Event):(9y Thing)(x = y)
Abstracts objects are things in this sense, but they can be distinguished from
physical things in that only the latter are things that can exist (concretely).
Reference to physical objects (that do in fact exist), accordingly, can be taken
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on this analysis to be reference to things that exist. That is, formally,
(8x Physical Object) =df (8x Thing)(E!(x)! );
(9x Physical Object) =df (9x Thing)(E!(x) ^ ):
Events are also concrete objects (i.e. objects that can exist), but they are
di¤erent from physical objects in that they are not things.
Aside from their referential role, what is most distinctive about sortal
concepts is the role they have in identity statements, particularly in state-
ments of identication and re-identication. A minimal valid thesis about
re-identication, for example, is the claim that any object to which we can
now refer is identiable at any other time at which it exists by means of some
sortal under which it is now identiable. Using the now-operator, N , this
thesis can be formulated as follows:
(A) (8x)t (E!(x)! (9S)[x S ^N (x S)])
This thesis is valid even withc instead oft (and is vacuous when applied to
abstract objects).26 A somewhat stronger thesis, which does not require the
now-operator, claims that anything to which we can refer is (now) identiable
by means of a sortal under which it is re-identiable whenever it exists (even
across possible worlds):
(B) (8x)(9S)(x S ^c[E!(x)! x S]):
Husserl seems to have something like this in mind in his claim that any
object whatever points to a structure ... that is governed by a ... universal
rule governing other consciousnesses of it as identical (1970, p. 53f). If
such a rule is to apply only to the object in question, then the claim can be
reconstructed in terms of proper names which are also sortal concepts in
that proper names bring with them certain identity criteria associated with
their correct use (in a given domain). Stated in terms of proper name sortals,
the thesis becomes:
(C) (8x)(9S)[PN(S) ^ x S];
which, given the denition of PN(S), implies (B). (Note, however, that
whereas (B) is vacuous when applied to abstract objects, (C) is not.) Though
26See Cocchiarella 1977 for a set-theoretic semantics and more detailed discussion of this
and some of the other theses described here regarding the problem of re-identication.
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it may be assumed in some special limited domains, we do not propose adopt-
ing such a strong thesis for the general framework of knowledge representa-
tion. Nor do we propose adopting even the weaker thesis (B) except, again,
at best only for special domains of knowledge representation.
One wrong reason for adopting (C) is the idea that identity across possi-
ble worlds (and time) requires a narrowingof identity criteria to a point of
uniqueness (usually specied in terms of an individual essence). (The notion
of an individual essence in these contexts is usually based on a confusion be-
tween identication, which is a conceptual process, and individuation, which
is an ontological process.) But cross-world and temporal re-identication
need not be based on such a narrowing of identity criteria, and in fact
might be based on a wideninginstead as provided, for example, by a su-
perordinate sortal. Thus, e.g., it is just such a widening that someone might
resort to when he (re-)identies the girl he met twenty years ago with the
woman he has met today: that is, the girl he met years ago is the same
person as the woman he met today.
Sortal (and common name) subordination (strict and otherwise) can be
dened as follows:
S1  S2 =df c(8x)[x S1 ! x S2];
S1 < S2 =df (S1  S2) ^ :(S2  S1):
One version of the thesis that objects can always be (re-)identied under a
superordinate sortal is
(D) (8S)(8x S)c[E!(x)! (9T )(S  T ^ x S)];
which states that anything identiable by a sortal S is identiable whenever
it exists (even across worlds) by some sortal to which S is subordinate. Note
that (D) allows that the superordinate sortal by which an object is identied
at one time (or in one world) need not be the same as the superordinate
sortal by which that object is identied at a di¤erent time (or world)
which indicates why, although (D) implies (A), it does not imply (B). The
somewhat stronger thesis that re-identication can be achieved by means of
the same superordinate sortal whenever the object exists, i.e.,
(E) (8S)(9T )(S  T ^ (8x S)c[E!(x)! x T ]);
does imply (B) (and therefore (A) as well). But as with (B), we do not claim
here that either (D) or (E) is valid without qualication in all domains of
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knowledge representation. Such qualication can be found in the framework
of conceptual natural realism in the ontological category of natural kinds.
8 Sortals and Natural Kinds
In natural language and our commonsense understanding of the world there is
a basic dichotomy between sortals for artifacts and sortals for natural kinds
where, by a natural kind, I mean not a concept but a causal structure
of a certain determinate type or category. In particular, a natural kind is
a type of causal structure or mechanism in nature that is the basis of the
powers or capacities that objects have to act, behave, function, etc., in certain
determinate lawlike ways i.e. ways that lead us to speak of those objects as
belonging to a natural kind. It is the ontological category of natural kinds as
causal structures that is the basis of the natural laws regarding the di¤erent
natural kinds of objects there are, or could be, in the world.
Informally, natural kinds are understood here to include the various gen-
era and species of plants and animals which we will speak of as natural
kinds of things as well as the natural kinds of substances (in the chemical
sense) such as gold, water, oxygen, etc., which we will speak of as natural
kinds of stu¤ . Natural kinds of things (in the sense understood here) are
wholes that are more than the sum of their parts or the bits of stu¤ that
make them up (and correspond to what Aristotle meant by primary sub-
stances). An animal or plant, for example, is a natural kind of thing that
over time will change much of the material stu¤ that makes it up, while still
remaining the same animal or plant. A puddle of water, on the other hand,
or the sodium chloride in a salt shaker, etc., is also a (concrete) thing (and as
such is a value of the bound individual variables), but it is so only in the sense
of being an actual bit (or quantity) of a natural kind of stu¤, and as such it
is no more than the sum of the minimal bits of the kind(s) of stu¤ that make
it up. (The minimal bits of a natural kind of stu¤ are atoms or molecules,
which are the only bits of that kind that are natural kinds of things as well.
That is, atoms and molecules of a natural kind of stu¤ are both minimal bits
of that kind of stu¤ and natural kinds of things.) As already noted, natural
kinds of stu¤ include compound substances, such as water or salt, as well as
elementary substances, such as hydrogen, gold, iron, uranium, etc.
The assumption that there are natural kinds of things or stu¤is a develop-
ment of conceptual natural realism into a version of Aristotelian essentialism
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where natural kinds correspond to what Aristotle called secondary sub-
stances. Aristotelian essentialism, or something very much like it, is implicit
in the commonsense view of the world that we express in natural language a
framework in which natural kinds, as already noted, are taken to correspond
not to predicates but to sortal common names. Ontologically, this means
that the category of natural kinds is not the same as the category of natural
properties a categorial distinction that we retain in conceptual realism as
a formal ontology, where natural kinds are assumed to correspond not to
predicable concepts (as I had maintained in earlier articles) but to sortal
concepts instead. This approach will provide not only a more appropriate
representation of the ontology of natural language understanding, but also a
clearer metaphysical foundation for our theoretical sciences as well. For this
reason, accordingly, we introduce new quantiers 8k and 9k, which, when
a¢ xed to sortal variables, are assumed to refer to natural kinds.
The question as to which of our sortal concepts there corresponds a nat-
ural kind is no less an empirical matter than is the question as to which of
our predicable concepts there corresponds a natural property or relation, and
the grounds on which we make such an assumption can be either very rig-
orous (as in highly theoretical domains) or very informal (as in the domains
of commonsense knowledge or belief). Also, just as in the case for natural
properties and relations, there are some general laws for natural kinds that
apply to all domains i.e. laws of conceptual realism that are part of the
general framework for knowledge representation. Thus, for example, just as
it is part of natural realism in general that every natural property or rela-
tion is realizable in nature, so too every natural kind is realizable in nature
as well (even though natural kinds are not properties but causal structures
complementary to properties), i.e.,
(K1) (8kS)c(9ex)x S;
is a general law for natural kinds. Another such general law is that only
(concrete) existents can belong to a natural kind, i.e.,
(K2) (8kS)(8x)[x S ! E!(x)];
in which case the restricted existential quantier (9ex) in (K1) can be re-
placed by the unrestricted existential quantier (9x). Also, just as natural
properties are identicalwhen, as matter of natural necessity, they always
have the same instances, so too natural kinds are identicalif, as a matter
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of natural necessity, any object belonging to the one kind must belong to the
other as well. We can, accordingly, extend our use of c as an abbreviatory
notation so as to apply to sortal expressions as well:
(S1 c S2) =df (S1  S2) & (S2  S1):
The thesis, which also holds for natural properties and relations, that
natural kinds are the same in all causally possible worlds (i.e. worlds having
the same laws of nature as ours) is expressed with this notation as follows:
(K3) (8kS1)c(9kS2)(S1 c S2):
The analysis of what it means to say that there is a natural kind correspond-
ing to a given sortal S (complex or simple), i.e. that S represents a natural
kind, can be given now simply as follows:
NK(S) =df (9kT )(S c T ):
There are general laws for natural kinds that do not also hold for natural
properties. The most important and fundamental such law is a law of rigidity
according to which an object can belong to a natural kind only if it must
belong to that kind whenever it exists, i.e.,
(K4) (8kS)(8x) (c(x S)! c[E!(x)! x S])
(With S5 as the modal logic forc and c, the antecedent condition, c(x S),
can be replaced by just (x S).) Note that, by (K4), any object that is
identiable by means of a sortal to which there corresponds a natural kind
is re-identiable by means of that sortal whenever it exists. That is,
(Bk) NK(S)! (8x S)c[E!(x)! x S];
which is the counterpart of (B) for objects identiable by means of a sortal for
a natural kind, is provable on the basis of (K4). If we also assume (as an ideal
of scientic inquiry) the methodological thesis that every object belonging to
a natural kind is identiable by means of a sortal that represents a natural
kind, i.e.,
(MT1) (8x)[(9kT )x T ! (9S)(NK(S) & x S)];
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then an identifying principle even closer to (B), namely,
(Bk2) (8x)[(9kT )(x T )! (9S)(x S & c[E!(x)! x S])];
is also derivable from (K4).
There are other principles of (re-)identication that, like (B), are not
valid in general, but which are valid when suitably restricted to sortals for
natural kinds. One such principle is the intersection thesis of Stevenson 1975
that if any two sortals intersect then there is a sortal to which both are
subordinate:
(IT ) (9x S1)x S2 _ (9x S2)x S1 ! (9T )(S1  T ^ S2  T ):
This thesis is not valid in general because new sortals can always be added to
a given domain of knowledge representation that can falsify it, so that even
if it were to hold in a given restricted domain, it need not also hold in an
expanded or larger domain. With an ontology of natural kinds, however, i.e.
with constraints that go beyond mere concept-formation, an even stronger
version of this thesis is valid for sortals suitably qualied.
The relevant ontological law here is the Partition Principle, i.e., the prin-
ciple that if two natural kinds that can intersect, then one must be subordi-
nate to the other:
(K5) (8kS1)(8kS2)[c(9x)(x S1 ^ x S2)! S1  S2 _ S2  S1]:
The idea behind this principle is that the family of natural kinds to which
an object can belong forms a chain of subordination of one natural kind to
another - where each natural kind in the chain is, as it were, a template
structure that is causally more determinate and ner-grained than the nat-
ural kinds to which it is subordinate. The partition determined by this chain
is described in a consequence of (K5), which states in e¤ect that natural
kinds that are subordinate to the same immediate genus are either identi-
calor necessarily disjoint.27 Together with (K4), incidentally, (K5) implies
that an object can belong to two natural kinds only if, as a matter of natural
necessity, it belongs to the one kind when and only when it belongs to the
other, i.e.,
(8kS1)(8kS2)(8x)[c(x S1) ^ c(x S2)! c(x S1 $ x S2)]
27See Cocchiarella 1989a, section 14, for a detailed formulation of this and other laws
for natural kinds.
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is a valid consequence of (K4) and (K5). In regard to the intersection thesis,
note that if S and T are sortals for which there are corresponding natural
kinds, then, by (K5), the following strong intersection thesis,
NK(S) & NK(T )! [c(9x S)x T _ c(9x T )x S ! S  T _ T  S]:
is valid.
Another assumption made in Stevenson 1975 that is not universally valid
for sortals, but which has some plausibility when restricted to sortals for
natural kinds, is the thesis that every sortal concept is subordinate to some
ultimate sortal. Dening the notion of an ultimate sortal as follows,
Ult(S) =df :(9T )(S < T );
Stevensons ultimate-sortals thesis can be formulated as
(US) (8S)(9T )[S  T ^ Ult(T )]:
Like (IT ), this thesis is not valid for all domains, because, unlike the kinds of
constraints imposed by ontological laws, there are no laws or constraints on
concept-formation regarding the addition of new sortals to a given domain
of knowledge representation. That is, new sortals can always be added to a
given domain that would invalidate (US) in an extended or larger domain.
What gives (US) it plausibility is the qualied use it can have for sortals
that represent natural kinds. A sortal for an ultimate natural kind, for
example, can be dened as follows,
Ultk(S) =df NK(S) & :(9T )[NK(T ) ^ S < T ];
and a summum genus principle to the e¤ect that every natural kind sortal is
subordinate to an ultimate natural kind sortal can be formulated as
(USk) (8S)(NK(S)! (9T )[Ultk(T ) ^ S  T ]):
Note that a restricted version of thesis (E) (and of (D) as well) of the previous
section, namely,
(Ek) (8S)[NK(S)! (9T )(S  T ^ (8x S)c[E!(x)! x T ])];
is a consequence of (USk):
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This does not mean that (USk) and (Ek) are valid. What must be distin-
guished here is (USk) as a conceptual thesis about sortals for natural kinds,
as opposed to an ontological thesis about natural kinds simpliciter, i.e. about
natural kinds independently of whether or not they are represented by sor-
tals. The relevant ontological law here is not (USk), but the Summum Genus
Principle that every object belonging to a natural kind belongs to a summum
genus of all the natural kinds to which to which that object belongs, i.e.,
(K6) (8x)(8kS1)
 
x S1 ! (9kT )[x T ^ (8kS2)(x S2 ! S2  T )]

:
Given the partition principle (K5), an alternative way to formulate (K6) is
as
(K60) (8kS1)(9kT )[S1  T ^ :(9kS2)(T < S2)];
which is the ontological counterpart of (USk) as a conceptual thesis.
One way to connect the ontological law and the conceptual principle here
is by means of a methodological assumption that (as an ideal of scientic
inquiry) every ontological summum genus, i.e. every natural kind that is a
summum genus, can be represented by a sortal:
(MT2) (8kS1)[:(9kS2)(S1 < S2)! (9T )(S c T )]:
That is, given (K60) as an ontological law of conceptual realism, and (MT2)
as a methodological thesis, (USk) as a conceptual thesis follows.
There are other ontological laws for natural kinds  such as an Inma
Species Principle, or the principle that every genus is the sum of its species,
etc. that are also part of the general framework of conceptual realism as
a formal ontology. We forego their discussion here and note only that these
laws also have conceptual counterparts, which while not valid in general,
may have qualied forms in which they may have at least a certain method-
ological utility. It is this distinction between ontological laws and conceptual
theses, and the methodological issues that connect them, that seems to be the
real basis of the distinction between what is called the ontological level and
the conceptual level and perhaps also the epistemological level as well in
knowledge representation.
9 Concluding Remarks
We have given here only an overview or sketch of conceptual realism as a
formal ontology, i.e. as a theory of logical form having both conceptual and
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ontological categories but in which the latter are represented in terms of
the former. The categories of natural kinds and of natural properties and
relations, for example, are represented in terms of the categories of sortals
and predicable concepts, respectively, and the category of abstract objects
is represented in terms of the process of conceptual nominalization (reica-
tion) as a subcategory of objects. Not all of these categories or parts of
this formal ontology will be relevant in every domain of knowledge repre-
sentation, but each is relevant at least to some domains and is needed in a
comprehensive framework for knowledge representation. In those domains
where certain categorial distinctions are not needed such as that between
predicative and impredicative concepts, or that between predicable concepts
and natural properties and relations, or between sortal concepts and natural
kinds, etc. we can simply ignore or delete the logical forms in question.
What must remain as the core of the system is the intensional logic around
which all of the other categories are built namely, the second-order predi-
cate logic with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms that we call
HST  . It is this core, I believe, that can serve as a universal standard by
which to evaluate other representational systems.
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